The Sleeper Cell Next Door
By: Jamie Glazov

FP: Brian Jenkins, welcome to Frontpage Interview.

Jenkins: Thank you.

FP: What do you make of Osama’s latest videos?

Jenkins: Communications comprise a key component of al Qaeda’s campaign. We see it as a military contest. Bin Laden sees it as building an army of believers. All wartime communications are aimed at the home front. Even as bin Laden appears to be addressing us, his followers are his primary audience.

The latest bin Laden tape informs them that, despite being the target of a worldwide, high-tech manhunt, he is alive, well, his robes are clean and pressed, he has access to a barber, he is serene, up on world events, he reads books, he is engaged and in charge—hardly the portrait of a fugitive. His acolytes see his survival as evidence of divine protection.

The words themselves hit the recurring themes. Bin Laden’s basic message is one of incitement. Bin Laden tells his followers not to wait for the center to do something for them, but to take action on their own—only continued terrorist operations ensure the continued relevancy of al Qaeda, and continued relevancy is bin Laden’s chief concern. His invitation to Americans to embrace Islam in order to end their troubles is the traditional Muslim offer to infidels—if we refuse, violence is justified. But it is also sincere. Fanatics cannot comprehend why anyone would not join them in the joy of their certainties.

The mesage contains no specific threats—these messages never do, but if we needed reminding, the tape tells us the violence will continue. In the eyes of our terrorist foes, this is a battle between God and evil, and it will continue until evil is vanquished or Judgment Day, which ever comes first.

FP: The Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said recently that U.S. authorities are worried about “sleeper cells” of would-be terrorists inside the United States. What kind of threat do “sleeper cells” pose to us?

Jenkins: I am not sure how the DNI is using the term, “sleeper cells.” Historically, sleeper cells were agents of a foreign government or organization infiltrated into the target country or recruited inside the country. The cells would remain dormant—they “sleep”—until awakened by their masters to carry out acts of espionage or sabotage. We have very little evidence of classic sleeper cells waiting to be awakened by al Qaeda, although some fear that al Qaeda may be gradually deploying a secret terrorist army that will rise up in some future terrorist surge.

The 9/11 hijackers were not sleepers. They were active al Qaeda operatives who came to the United States to prepare for the terrorist attack. They weren’t sleeping, we were.

Recently, the term “sleeper cell” has been expanded to include local terrorist operatives who remain hidden until they are commanded or decide on their own to act. That changes the meaning somewhat.

FP: How would you portray the jihadist threats inside the United States?

Jenkins: Before 9/11, when al Qaeda had a more centralized command structure, it recruited, dispatched, and supported operatives in the field. They comprised the jihadist network that reconnoitered possible targets, helped plan operations, and supported those who would carry out the actual attacks.

Pounded after 9/11, al Qaeda’s leaders had to alter their strategy. Continued terrorist operations remain essential, but the operational environment is more hostile now. The communications, international travel and transfers of funds that we now know accompanied the run-up to 9/11 are more likely to be picked up by intelligence. Instead of dispatching terrorist teams to carry out attacks, today’s al Qaeda’s leaders exhort others to adopt their ideology and wage violent jihad without waiting for specific instructions from the center. These are homegrown terrorists who self-radicalize and carry out terrorist attacks on their own initiative.

The center may be able to assist them by providing instruction over the Internet, moving jihadist volunteers via underground networks to training camps, mainly in Pakistan, providing some funds, and some say, a “guiding hand,” but for the most part, the local cells are on their own, dependent on their own resources plus what they might get out of lateral connections. I should hasten to add that connectivity in the jihadist universe is always murky, and analysts debate the role of the center. Some see it as reduced to mere exhortation. Others see direct connections behind most attacks.

FP: How successful has al Qaeda been at recruiting terrorists here in the United States?

Jenkins: Radicalization and recruitment are taking place here. Clusters of wannabe or would be terrorists have been broken up. Others remain under surveillance. But there is no evidence of a large cohort of terrorist operatives. What we have instead are bunches of angry guys who have been radicalized by the rhetoric, who fantasize about terrorist operations, and who may be conducting reconnaissance of targets, and in some cases, seeking the capabilities to carry out attacks. These homegrown conspiracies that operate beneath our intelligence radar are currently the biggest danger we face—not centrally-dispatched terrorist teams, although al Qaeda’s leaders remain determined to carry out another major attack equal to or exceeding 9/11.

FP: How dangerous are they if they lack capability?

Jenkins: No doubt, some are just hotheads venting their anger by bragging about what they will do as terrorists. Some are incompetent. An example of this would be the well-educated but hopelessly inept physicians who recently carried out the failed terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow. But if they remain determined, they will eventually acquire the capability to do something lethal. Determination is the constant. Capability is the variable. Although he was not a jihadist, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh demonstrated that, with some know-how, almost any damn fool can build a big bomb and kill a lot of people.

FP: Critics have said that FBI and police, using informants, have instigated terrorist plots, which they can then bust in order to prove there is a terrorist threat and at the same time demonstrate that they are doing their job. What do you think?

Jenkins: The authorities are in a difficult position. They are under pressure to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur as opposed to a traditional criminal investigations approach where, after a crime is committed, investigators attempt to identify and apprehend the perpetrator. That’s unsatisfactory when the perpetrators are bent upon mass murder and may be willing to die in the process.

If the authorities move in too soon, they reduce the chances of a successful prosecution, although sometimes breaking up a terrorist plot is more important than successful prosecution. If they wait too long, they risk missing an operation. British authorities reportedly were previously aware of at least two of the four terrorist bombers who killed 52 people and themselves in 2005. With limited resources, the authorities couldn’t track everyone and the two were considered marginal figures. The next time we saw them was on the cameras entering the subways to carry out their attack. In the meantime, at least one of them learned how to build bombs.

FP: You assisted in the preparation of the recent report by the New York Police Department on homegrown terrorism. What is the importance of this report?

Jenkins: I was a sidewalk engineer and technical reviewer. The report describes the trajectories of radicalization that produced operational terrorist cells in Hamburg—the team responsible for the 9/11 hijackings, Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Sydney and Toronto. It constructs an analytical framework that tracks jihadist recruits from pre-radicalization to self-identification to indoctrination to jihadization—a cycle that ends with capture or death. It then compares this model with the trajectories of radicalization observed in conspiracies within the United States. This is the most comprehensive review across national boundaries. It will become a model for comparison with future cases.

FP: Were you surprised by the controversy the report provoked?

Jenkins: Not at all. It touches on sensitive subjects and it was anticipated that it would provoke debate. The decision was to have that debate. That is the way our noisy democracy works. Although the report said almost nothing about intelligence operations, critics hollered “Police State.” “Big Brother!” “Stereotyping!”

FP: Some organizations have criticized the report as anti-Muslim or anti-Arab. How do you respond?

Jenkins: Again that was to be expected, although it was disappointing to hear one prominent Arab-American critic say on a radio broadcast the day after the NYPD report came out that he had read it “last night” when the same individual already denounced it the day before. There are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, perhaps 1.6 million in this country. The report talks about perhaps a hundred or so men, all engaged in carrying out terrorist attacks, planning terrorist attacks, or supporting terrorist operations. The decision to include them in the report was made on the basis of their actions, not their race, ethnicity, or faith. It is hardly an assault on Islam.

FP: Still, most of them were Arabs or South Asians.

Jenkins: The report was specifically about jihadization after 9/11. It was not about Basque separatists or animal rights extremists. It wasn’t about global warming. Look, racial or ethnic profiling to determine security measures is not only wrong, it is stupid in a diverse population like ours. At the same time, it would be foolish to ignore clearly identifiable patterns. In the 1960s, the FBI broke the violent arm of the Ku Klux Klan, which was responsible for bombing black churches and murdering civil rights workers. Not surprisingly, intelligence work focused mainly on white Southern males. If there were any African-American or Jewish members of the Klan, they were seriously misguided. Is it politically incorrect to observe that Puerto Rican separatists who carried out bombings in New York and Chicago in the 1970s were mostly Puerto Ricans? And is it anti-Semitic to note that members of the Jewish Defense League who years ago carried out a number of acts of terrorism in New York were—hold on to your hat—Jews?

FP: How did the media handle the NYPD report?

Jenkins: Many of those who reported on it were more accustomed to press conferences where police announce they have just saved the city by arresting eight terrorists. They were baffled when instead they were handed something that looked like a RAND report. Where were the handcuffs? Why was the NYPD doing this? The electronic medium reacted for the most predictably and reflexively, hyping the terrorist threat rather than addressing the more complicated issues of radicalization and what we can do about it.

FP: What can we do about homegrown jihadization?

Jenkins: How we might dissuade young men from a destructive and self-destructive course is still something we need to figure out. Clearly, we must operate within the law and in a manner consistent with our values. Clearly, it is more than a police matter—it is a challenge to the entire community. And clearly, we must not do anything that isolates, alienates, stigmatizes or antagonizes any community. The fact that we apparently do not have in this country deep reservoirs of support for al Qaeda’s ideology of violence is good news. It gives us some time to carefully consider how we approach the problem. In his latest videotape, Osama bin Laden calls for “caravans of martyrs.” We want to make sure he doesn’t find them here.

FP: Are you optimistic or pessimistic in our struggle with radical Islam?

Jenkins: I have no doubt that we shall prevail in this contest.

FP: Brian Jenkins, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.

Jenkins: Thank you for the opportunity to address your readers.

Bookmark and Share:

Please Rate this Article:

5 of 5 Stars 4 of 5 Stars 3 of 5 Stars 2 of 5 Stars 1 of 5 Stars 0 of 5 Stars

Current Rating: